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Abstract: The experimental literature and studies using survey data have established that people
care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely, as standard
economic theory assumes, about their absolute economic position. Individuals are
concerned about social comparisons. However, behavioral evidence in the field is rare.
This paper provides an empirical analysis, testing the model of inequity aversion using
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have usually assumed that individuals evaluate their welfare in absolute terms.
Traditionally, choices affect only the agents directly involved. However, individuals may
judge their own situations in relation to other individuals’ situations. The importance of social
interactions has long been emphasized by important figures such as Adam Smith (1759/1976),
Karl Marx (1849), Thorstein Veblen (1899) or James Duesenberry (1949). The experimental
economics literature has explored (pro-)social preferences through designs that implement
one’s own and others’ material payoffs. We observe models of reciprocity, inequity aversion,
or altruism (see Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Miller 2002). Research on happiness, using survey data (for
example, Easterlin 1995, 2001, Clark and Oswald 1996, Ng 1997, McBride 2001, Frey and
Stutzer 2002a,b, Layard 2003, Luttmer 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Frey 2008), finds
strong empirical support for the importance of relative position. Furthermore, as an alternative
strategy, scholars have used hypothetical questions regarding choice between alternative
states or outcomes representing relative positional concerns (Alpizar, Carlsson and
Johansson-Stenman 2005, Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson and Daruvala 2002, Solnick and
Hemenway 1998, Tversky and Griffin 1993, Zeckhauser 1991).
Social comparisons have also been found to be important in other areas. McAdams
(1992) stresses that “economic explanations of a multitude of disparate behaviors – how much
people save, what wages they will require, what risks they will take, how they respond to
taxation, etc. – will be seriously incomplete unless they account for the relative effects of such
decisions” (p. 5). Several experimental studies have found evidence that support the
importance of social preferences. However, critics question the applicability of experimental
results to a “real world” environment, where individuals are subject to actual incentives in a
social setting. Many authors would like to see more evidence from field data. For example,
3List (2005) emphasizes: “Despite these advances and the topic’s importance, it is fair to say
that little is known about whether, and to what extent, social preferences influence economic
outcomes in naturally occurring markets” (p. 2). Solnick and Hemenway (2005) point out that
the literature on positional concerns remains largely theoretical rather than empirical (p. 147).
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) argue: “While extensive evidence from experimental
economics indicates that individuals take account the effect of their actions on others in
laboratory games, whether individuals exhibit social preferences in the workplace is largely
unknown” (p. 917). Senik (2005), providing an overview of the literature, points out: “it is
surprising that in spite of the large theoretical literature on relative income and comparison
effects […] empirical validation of this conjecture is still scarce” (p. 47).
These statements suggest that empirical evidence based on field data may be able to
provide useful new evidence. We present evidence that suggests that people behave similarly
in laboratory and non-laboratory environments. In particular, we analyze whether inequity
aversion or the equity theory help to predict the behavior in a competitive environment, where
employees within a team are subject to pay differences. We investigate how the performance
of team members alters if their (dis)advantage in the relative income position changes. In
addition, we empirically analyze if negative deviations from a reference outcome count as
much as, or more than, positive deviations. This enables us to test theories of social
preferences and, in particular, inequity aversion. In order to explore these questions, we have
collected two unique panel data sets on basketball and soccer players. Using such data has
several advantages compared to other (labor) data sources. The data has low variable errors.
Performance is clearly observable and is free of discrepancies. Furthermore, the environment
is comparable to field experiments, due to the fact that a game takes place in a controlled
environment. All players are faced with the same rules and regulations. Thus, when
investigating the connection between relative position and performance, many factors can be
4controlled for. The job profile is similar and social comparisons are likely to happen. In
addition, transparent salary information is available.
Due to the advantages outlined, a number of other studies have used sports data in the
past. In order to test existing theories in promotion tournaments, disciplines like professional
baseball (Hill and Spellman 1983; Scully 1974), basketball (Wallace 1988, Kahn and Sherer
1988), car racing (Becker and Huselid 1992, Bothner, Kang and Stuart 2007), golf (see
Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 1990b; Melton and Zorn 2000; Orszag 1994), horse racing
(Fernie and Metcalf 1999; Lynch and Zax 1998), running (Maloney and McCormick 2000;
Lynch and Zax 2000), and tennis (Sunde 2003) have been investigated. However, our paper
explores the relationship between individual pay and performance in an organization in a
different manner. We investigate how relative compensation affects employee motivation and
performance. We can assume that people compare their salaries with people close to
themselves (Layard 2003). Thus, not only the absolute level, but also the relative income,
might be a major determinant of their position. Accordingly, we expect that people care
greatly about their relative position, since income comparisons are widespread in
organizations. In this regard, Frank and Sunstein (2001, p. 347) point out that “[…] positional
concerns typically loom larger with income than with the goods that regulation attempts to
provide (safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children and ailing relatives).”
Pay distribution indeed has important behavioral consequences on the workforce
(Harder 1992). Merit pay may be ineffective and even lead to disruptive behavior
(Cropanzano, Bowen and Gilliland 2007, Pfeffer and Sutton 2006). When exploring the pay-
performance relationship, many studies have been hindered in the past by the lack of available
data. In this regard, Lazear (2000, p. 1346) points out that: “Much of the theory in personnel
5economics relates to effects of monetary incentives on output, but the theory was untested
because appropriate data were unavailable”1.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present a theoretical model. Based on
this theoretical foundation, several hypotheses are developed. Section III describes the
econometric methodology used. The empirical results are discussed in Section IV. Section V
concludes.
II. PERFORMANCE UNDER SOCIAL PREFERENCES
For many years, economic models have disregarded the relevance of social interactions, while
other social sciences, such as social psychology, sociology or anthropology, have placed
considerable emphasis on the relevance of relative preferences as being fundamental to
human motivation. The psychological theory of social comparison (see Festinger 1954) and
the sociological theory of relative deprivation (Stouffer 1949) show that comparisons with
others are an important phenomenon. Relative deprivation theory investigates interpersonal
and inter-group relations and comparisons. It stresses that a lower perception of one’s own
(group) status or one’s own welfare in relation to another person (group) can be the source of
hostility towards the other individual or group. A person feels deprived when his/her situation
(e.g., individual earnings) falls relative to the reference group. If improvement of the situation
is slower than expected, the experience of frustration can even lead to aggression (see, e.g.,
Walker and Pettigrew 1984).
In economics, the role of social interactions has been highlighted in the works of
Veblen and Duesenberry. Veblen (1899) emphasizes the importance of one’s own relative
                                                 
1 Abowd (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) investigate the relationship
between pay and managerial performance or corporate returns, and Asch (1990) for Navy recruiters’
reactions to different incentive plans.
6position in society with one’s concepts of conspicuous leisure and consumption. Contrary to
standard utility theory, Duesenberry’s (1949) utility concept is characterized by
systematically interdependent utilities incorporating relative preferences into consumer
theory. Early attempts include the attributes of others directly in the utility function (see
Becker 1974 for a discussion). Several models have been developed in the last few years to
describe non-selfish behavior, assuming that individuals seek to maximize well-defined
preferences, permitting preferences to depend on the consumption and behavior of others
(Bolton 1991, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002
and Sobel 2005 for an overview).
In our framework, we assume that an agent i maximizes his preferences, being
constrained by his working environment. Consider the following simple formulation of
worker i’s utility:
),()(),( iiiiiii eReCseU ss +−= (1)
where s denotes a vector of wages for all the workers ],...,2,1[ ni = , ie  is the effort level that
worker i chooses, )( ii eC  is the cost function of ie  and ),( ii eR s  is a cost or benefit function
the worker experiences from social comparison in relation to s and ie . The worker’s payoff is
is  for this period. The assumption here is that the vector s is fixed for a certain period and that
the worker has done everything he could to improve the situation with regard to ),( ii eR s . He
is now locked in a contract for a certain period, and the only option to change his outcome is
to vary the level of effort he puts into his work. Note that our effort level does not define the
number of hours worked (which are usually fixed), but the intensity of physical labor. The
cost of effort ie  is given by:
7iiiiiii reeceeC )()(
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where ic  is the standard cost for the squared effort, which reflects the increasing cost of
physical labor with effort, ir  is the reputational benefit or cost due to deviating from the
expected level of effort *ie . This includes social benefits and costs as well as possible changes
in future wages.
We divide the inequality factor ),( ii eR s  into two separate factors to account for
differences in advantageous ),( ii eA s  and disadvantageous ),( ii eB s  differences in wages.
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Both factors are defined in a similar way. There is an individual scaling factor iα / iβ  that
shows the worker’s preferences with regard to the wage inequality. The ∑  adds up all the
differences in wages above (below) the worker’s own wage. This model can be seen as a
general model of interdependent preferences, where a positive ( ii βα + ) reflects altruism and
a negative ( ii βα + ) reflects spite ( Sobel 2005). According to Runciman (1966), the
difference ( ji ss − ) is a measure of comparison: “the magnitude of a relative deprivation is the
extent of the difference between the desired situation and that of the person desiring it” (p.
10).
The worker can adjust his effort level to reduce the effects of the wage inequality.
Note that a percentage decrease in effort can either reduce or increase wage inequality by the
8same amount, depending on the sign of the individual scaling factor iα / iβ . By setting 
*
ii ee =
and 0=ic , we can translate this model to the inequity model used by Schmidt and Fehr
(1999), who examined inequality aversion in a payoff environment without efforts. Note that,
despite this similarity, we don’t restrict our coefficients to ii βα ≤≤0  in order to allow more
flexibility.
To get the optimal effort level, a worker maximizes his utility according to his effort,
assuming that he is a wage-taker. Setting the first order condition 
i
i
i e
U
U
∂
∂
=''  equal to 0, we
obtain the optimal effort:
i
i
ji
ij
iij
ij
ii c
r
ss
n
ss
n
e
2
}0,max{
1
1
}0,max{
1
1
+−
−
+−
−
= ∑∑
≠≠
κλ (5)
where 
*2 ii
i
i ec
α
λ =  and 
*2 ii
i
i ec
β
κ =  are the initial inequality factors, scaled by the constant
individual cost and the expected effort variables. Thus, we can assume that, in this
framework, ii αλ ≈  and ii βκ ≈ . Even if this is not true for the functional form, it certainly
holds for the sign of the coefficients.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume ii βα ≤≤0  which, in our case, leads to ii κλ ≤≤0 .
This means that the performance loss from disadvantageous inequality is equal or greater than
the performance loss if worker i is better off than the reference group. Equation 5 then implies
that the performance decreases due to both advantage and disadvantageous inequality. As a
result, there is a general preference towards reducing inequity. Loewenstein, Bazerman, and
Thompson (1989), for example, find that subjects exhibit a strong and robust aversion against
disadvantageous inequality. Somewhat surprisingly, subjects also indicate an aversion to
9advantageous inequality. However, this effect is significantly weaker than the aversion to
disadvantageous inequality. These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: A relative income disadvantage leads to a decrease in individual
performance.
Hypothesis 2 A relative income advantage leads to a decrease in individual
performance.
Hypothesis 3 The performance loss from disadvantageous inequality is equal or
greater than the performance loss from advantageous inequality.
Equity theory suggests that a lack of equity in an exchange relationship creates a sense of
distress, especially for the victim (see Walster, Walster and Berscheid 1978). Homans (1961)
argues that disadvantage is followed by anger, and advantage by guilt. A change in
performance W may be seen as a reaction to restore equity. This theory was formulated by
Adams (1965), but has a long history that can be traced back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics. In this case, workers are motivated to balance the equation, and equity is attained
when equilibrium is reached. When the ratios are not aligned, workers feel the need to adapt
their behavior. Thus, in contrast, equity theory suggests that ii κλ << 0 . If worker i’s relative
income position increases, he may increase his performance by a certain amount to restore an
equitable situation. Greenberg (1988), for example, found that a relative advantage boosts
performance, since managers who were moved to higher-status offices increased their
performance. This would lead to a new hypothesis that competes with hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 4: A relative income advantage leads to an increase in individual
performance.
On the other hand, the equity theory also suggests that, if worker i’s relative income position
decreases, he may reduce his performance in order to restore an equitable situation. This
would be consistent with hypothesis 1. Greenberg (1988) also observed that managers who
were moved to lower-status offices decreased their performance. Interestingly, once returned
to their previous status offices, their performance increased again.
III. METHOD
3.1 Source of Comparison
3.1.1 Relative Income
People constantly compare themselves to others and care greatly about their relative position,
which in turn influences individual behavior. The literature so far has explored income as the
key variable for positional concerns. In addition to the absolute level of an individual’s
position (in particular income), the relative position is also important. The literature suggests
that income is more positional than leisure (Solnick and Hemenway 2005, Frank 1985, 1997,
Frank and Sunstein 2001, Neumark and Postlewaite 1998, Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman and
Martinsson 2007). Frank and Sunstein (2001, p. 347) point out: “[…] positional concerns
typically loom larger with income than with the goods that regulation attempts to provide
(safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children and ailing relatives).” Zeckhauser (1991, p.
9) notices: “In many workplaces, including most universities, salaries are not publicized.
Many of us would find our welfare substantially diminished, even though our income
11
remained the same, if we discovered that our colleagues were earning more than we were. In
part that is because the discovery would reveal the boss’s view of us. In part our reaction
would be merely envy.” Surveys of employers and employees suggest that salaries depend on
what employees think other people are paid. Furthermore, the perception of their relative
position has a large effect on their morale (Frank and Sunstein 2001).
Using income as a reference, some researchers have used hypothetical questions
regarding choice between alternative states or outcomes. Imagine a situation described by
Frank and Sunstein (2001, p. 336) of two hypothetical worlds: world A, where you can earn
$110,000 per year and others considerably more ($200,000); or world B, where you can earn
$100,000 per year and others even less ($85,000). Following the standard economic approach,
world A would be better, because it offers higher absolute consumption for its people. But the
actual choices made reveal a different picture. A substantial number of people opt for world
B. Similarly, Solnick and Hemenway (1998, p. 377) asked 257 faculty students and staff
members at the Harvard School of Public Health which world they would prefer. World A is
described as: “Your current annual income is $50,000; others earn $25,000”. World B is
described as: “Your current annual incomes is $100,000; others earn $200,000.” The results
indicate that approximately 50 percent of the respondents preferred world A, in which they
had half the real purchasing power, but a higher relative income position. Zeckhauser (1991,
p. 10) asked his American students whether they would prefer a per capita income of $25,000
in Japan and $24,000 in the United States, or $22,000 in Japan and $23,000 in the United
States. Many chose the latter, suggesting feelings of envy.
Data on sport professionals’ incomes is publicly available. This provides players with
information as to what other teammates are paid. Using this data for empirical testing, we can
expect income to be positional in our case.
3.1.2 Reference Group
Festinger (1954) emphasizes that people do not generally compare themselves with the rest of
the world, but with a more specific group. Typically, they take others they see as being
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similar to themselves, or “close to one’s own ability” (p. 121), as a reference group. Similarly,
soldiers in World War II seem to have made comparisons primarily with members of their
own military group (Stouffer 1949). In his Rhetoric (book II, chapter 10), Aristotle stresses
that envy is felt only towards those who are our equals or our peers:
“Potter against potter.
We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these
are our neighbours and equals; for it is clear that it is our own fault we have missed the
good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us. We also envy those who
have what we ought to have, or have got what we did have once. Hence old men envy
younger men, and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little on the
same thing. And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have
got it quickly”.
Similarly, Francis Bacon writes in his Essays of Counsels, Civil and Moral that proximity
defines the reference group:
“… near kinsfolks, and fellows in office, and those that have been bred together, are
more apt to envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their
own fortunes, and pointeth at them and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and
incurreth likewise more into the note of others.”
Studies have used such factors as similar age, community, country of residence, education,
gender, income, region, or a person’s cohort (see, e.g., Vendrik and Woltjer 2007, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2005, Luttmer 2005, Stutzer 2004, Easterlin 1995). Co-workers can be taken to be a
natural comparison group. However, co-workers have rarely been analyzed empirically due to
13
the lack of data. Our study serves to reduce this shortcoming. Our basic presumption is that
soccer and basketball players, like in other team sports, compare themselves with their
teammates.
3.2 Data
This paper uses a unique data set of professional basketball and soccer players. We explore
both leagues separately, using the same investigation period (seasons 1995/1996 till
2003/2004)2. Empirical studies on the effects of income differences on managerial behavior
have been hindered by the lack of data on individual performance and the lack of publicly
available income data. In contrast, in sports, such as soccer and basketball, individual and
team performance is well defined and can be readily observed.
3.2.1 Basketball
The data used refer to the most prestigious American league, namely the National Basketball
Association (NBA). There are 29 teams in the NBA, divided into two conferences (Eastern
and Western). The Eastern Conference is composed of the Atlantic Division and the Central
Division, while the Western Conference is composed of the Midwest Division and the Pacific
Division. Three Divisions each have seven teams, and the Central Division has eight teams.
Since 1969, each NBA team has to play an 82-game regular season schedule, playing 41
games at home and 41 away. In general, each team plays four games (two home and two
away) against every team in its Conference, and two games (one home and one away) against
every team in the other Conference. Each team is allowed a maximum of 12 active players on
its roster. Sixteen of the NBA’s 29 teams qualify for the NBA playoffs. To obtain adequate
comparison, our analysis focuses only on the regular season.
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3.2.1.1 Measuring Players’ Pay
Basketball games allow us to generate a broad data set, including players’ salaries. A large
part of the data has been collected through the website usatoday.com. Additional sources were
used to cover the nine seasons between 1995/1996 and 2003/2004. The data set covers not
only the contract salary but also additional salary components, such as bonuses.
3.2.1.2 Measuring Players’ Performance
It is useful to develop a composite index for the individual performance of a basketball player
(see, e.g., Harder 1992). A widely used method is shown in equation (6). The basic idea is to
add together all the “good things” that a player does, such as points scored (PTS), total
rebounds (TREB), steals (STL), blocks (BLK), and assists (AST), and then subtract the “bad
things”, namely turnovers (TO), field goals missed (FGMS) and free throws missed (FTMS).
The result is a performance index, which is then divided by the number of games. This is
done because less skilled players, with relatively low salaries play in fewer games.
PERFBasketball = 
GP
FTMSFGMSTOASTBLKSTLTREBPTS )()( ++−++++
(6)
Although this proxy gives an in-depth picture of players’ performance, it is not free of
potential biases. For example, the equal weight can be criticized. But even if it is not a perfect
measurement of a player’s productivity, it provides a good indicator for changes in
performance.
3.2.1.3 Soccer
The rising commercialization of soccer led to improved data sets. For example, in England,
publicly listed clubs are required to publish annual reports. For some national leagues, such as
                                                                                                                                                         
2 It was impossible to include 1997 in the soccer data set, because player salary information was unavailable.
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the German premier soccer league, salary data for individual players, or at least good proxies
thereof, is available. This paper uses a unique data set of professional soccer players in the
German premier soccer league Bundesliga3, taken from IMP, the official data provider of the
Bundesliga, and several broadcasting networks, as well as Kicker Sportmagazin, the most
prominent soccer magazine in Germany. This data includes soccer players’ personal
background and individual performance data over a period of eight seasons between
1995/1996 and 2003/2004. During the eight seasons, 28 different clubs participated in the
league, due to annual promotion and relegation.
The Bundesliga is one of Europe’s “big five” soccer leagues (for an overview, see
Dobson and Goddard 2001). Interestingly, between 1995 and 2004, the Bundesliga
consistently had the highest goal per game ratios of all five European soccer leagues. Dobson
and Goddard (2001, p. 31) report that, in 1999, Germany was the most “cosmopolitan”
league, with 42 percent foreign players. Finally, the Bundesliga has the most modern stadiums
and the highest average home attendances of all soccer leagues in Europe, profiting from
having hosted the 2006 world championship.
The league structure is similar to that in other European countries, but differs from US
sports leagues in several key aspects (for a detailed overview, see Hoehn and Szymanski
1999). First, the teams compete in many hierarchical competitions simultaneously. In each
season of the 18 teams that now make up the Bundesliga, three are relegated to, and three are
promoted from, the 2. Bundesliga. Furthermore, in contrast to US sports markets, applying a
rookie draft system, longer player contracts and salary caps in order to maintain a competitive
balance, there is an active transfer market between Bundesliga clubs.
In the past, some German clubs were owned by industrial enterprises (e.g., Bayer
Leverkusen), but the majority had the legal structure of a private social club. However, over
                                                 
3 Summary statistics are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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the last few decades, more clubs have been professionally commercialized and started to
interact increasingly with financial markets.
3.2.2.1 Measuring Players’ Pay
Although the Bundesliga do not officially reveal the soccer professionals’ salaries, there is
substantial transparency. Kicker Sportmagazin develops players’ market value estimates on an
annual basis, providing a good proxy for actual salaries being paid by the clubs4. Before a
new season starts, the editorial staff of Kicker Sportmagazin develops an estimation of
players’ market values. This data is likely to be consistent, since it has been collected in a
consistent and systematic manner for several years by an almost identical editorial team. In
order to check the extent to which the market value estimations used in this paper correctly
reflect actual salaries, the correlation between players’ effective reported salaries, as provided
by another reliable data source called Transfermarkt.de and our salary proxies, is investigated.
It may be argued that salary estimates are more precise for high-profile players and high-
profile teams, leading to measurement errors. The Transfermarkt.de data has the advantage of
covering salary information for high- and low-profile players, as well as high- and low-profile
teams. The measurement errors do not seem to be a major problem since the correlation
between these two data sources is high (r=0.754)5. As outlined in the empirical section, the
results obtained are robust when dealing with outliers. Moreover, the proxies for salaries are
even more satisfactory when analyzing the relative position of Bundesliga soccer players,
                                                 
4 Information from the Kicker Sportmagazin has been used for empirical research studies in the past (see for
instance Eschweiler and Vieth (2004), Hübl and Swieter (2002), Lehmann and Weigand (1999) and
Lehmann and Schulze (2005).
5 The publicly available data from Transfermarkt.de was only available for the season 2003/2004. Historical
data was not available, as the Internet site only started to collect this information in 2005. Furthermore,
Transfermarkt.de covers a limited number of players in the German Bundesliga.
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compared to their teammates and their opponents. In addition, our data set includes individual
transfer prices, as well as earnings from ticket sales, merchandizing, and sponsoring revenues
at the team level. Finally, we look at the effect of future and past salaries on current
performance.
3.2.2.2 Measuring Players’ Performance
In line with our basketball performance proxy, we develop a composite measure of
performance:
 PERFSoccer =  
GP
OFCFDWASGO +−++
(7)
with number of goals (GO), number of assists (AS), duels won (DW), and obtained fouls (OF)
entering positively, and committed fouls (CF) entering negatively. The result is a value, which
is then divided by the number of games played (GP). The performance index allows us to take
into account defensive and offensive aspects, as well as the level of successful and
unsuccessful aggression. The index measures the active involvement and success per game6.
3.3. Estimations and Controls
Investigating the pay-for-performance relationship requires a model that takes the incentive
effects of absolute and relative pay into account. Our resulting model captures whether future
pay affects a player’s current performance, assuming that his current performance is not
affected by the amount of money he has already been paid. Future pay is a major factor
influencing current performance. An individual’s performance is motivated by what he
expects to receive in the future. Such an expectation determines his level of motivation and
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the results remain robust when exploring single factors instead of an index.
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performance in the present (Harder 1992, Vroom and Deci 1992). As data on individual
perception is not available, we assume that the best available proxy for individual perception
is actual future pay. Thus, our specification has the following structure:
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 RELADVi(t+1) +β3 RELDISADVi(t+1)
 + β4 ABSALi(t+1)+TEAMDi +TDt + _i + εit (8)
where PERFit is the performance of player i at time t. To measure the relevance of inequity
aversion, equation (5) is used as a starting point. A relative income advantage RELADVi is
measured in line with the theoretical approach as }0,max{
1
1
ij
ij
ss
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−
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. A relative income
disadvantage RELDISADVi is defined as }0,max{
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1
ji
ij
ss
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. Moreover, ABSALi(t+1)  is
the future salary of a player. The regression also contains control variables CTRLit, such as
AGE and AGE SQUARED. Team dummy variables are included, as it can be argued that the
results are driven by unobserved team characteristics that are correlated with income and
performance. Team fixed effects allow us to control for such possible omitted variable bias.
However, estimates without team effects are also reported in order to go beyond a “within
team” focus. Similarly, the estimates include a set of time dummies (TDt) to control for
possible differences in the players’ environment; _i is the individual effect of player i, and εit
denotes the error term. In that way, we control for ability, since player fixed effects pick up
any omitted variables (player characteristics) that do not change over time.
A model using future pay assumes that a player is able to predict his own and other
players’ future income situation, and therefore his relative income position. However,
experimental studies suggest that individuals have difficulty in predicting their future utility
and tastes (for an overview, see, for example, Loewenstein Donoghue and Rabin 2003). We
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therefore check the robustness of the results, using present rather than future earnings as a
reference point, as it can be argued that players’ performance is less likely to be affected by
the amount of money they are currently receiving. On the other hand, we may still observe
incentive effects, as we investigate the relative income position of a player. Thus, our second
baseline specification has the following form:
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 RELADVit +β3 RELDISADVit
 + β4 ABSALit+TEAMDi +TDt + _i + εit (9)
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 present the results. Table 1 focuses on basketball, and Table 2 on soccer. We
differentiate between the future model (first six specifications) and the present model (last six
specifications). A first group of regressions report the beta or standardized regression
coefficients of an OLS regression with time fixed effects (seasons). The results reveal the
relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust standard errors in these
estimations, the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors are used. In a second
group of specifications, standard errors by players are clustered, since clustering picks up any
player-specific characteristics that change over time. Using eight soccer and nine basketball
seasons, ability can be taken to have a fixed and a variable portion. For example, a player’s
ability initially peaks and then declines prior to retirement, but throughout this cycle the
player’s ability stays above a player-specific threshold. Clustering allows us to control for the
part changing over time. Such an effect is partly controlled by variable age. However, it
makes sense to cluster the standard errors by player, since clustering will pick up any player-
specific characteristics that change over time. Similarly, ability is controlled for in the third
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group of specifications by using fixed effects regressions. It is useful to present specifications
without team fixed effects to go beyond a “within team findings” focus.
The results strongly suggest that social preferences and inequity aversion matter. Both
coefficients referring to the relative income position (above and below) are (with few
exceptions) negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficients for
absolute income are positive and (with only two exceptions) statistically significant. This
allows us to conclude that hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot be rejected. Players care about the salary
distribution within the team (reference group) and not just about their own salary. We also
find support that inequity aversion affects performance. There is a general preference towards
reducing inequity. On the other hand, equity theory can only provide a partial answer to how
players respond to income differences. As the performance of players declines if their
advantage in the relative income position increases, hypothesis 4 is rejected. The soccer
market also comes closest to the situation described in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model,
which assumes that the performance loss from disadvantageous inequality ( ij ss > ) is equal
or larger than the performance loss if player i is better off than the reference group j ( ij ss < ).
On the other hand, the results obtained with basketball data also indicate the tendency of a
stronger performance decrease for players having a relative income advantage. This finding is
also consistent with theories of personal motivation that stress the relevance of crowding-out
effects (Frey 1997, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Having a relative income advantage may
affect performance in a negative way, reducing the intrinsic motivation to perform. Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000), for example, found experimental support that the effect of monetary
compensation on performance was not monotonic. Subjects who were offered monetary
incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Pokorny
(2004) finds an inverted U shape between incentives and performance. Performance begins to
rise with an incentive increase, but after a certain point decreases with further incentives. Our
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findings complement this literature by noting that a crowding-out effect may also appear at
the relative and not just the absolute compensation level.
We now explore the effect on players’ behavior of a substantial change in the relative
income position. In case I, we focus on players that move from a relative income
disadvantage in t-1 to a relative income advantage in t. In case II, we explore the opposite
situation, where players move from a relative advantage to a relative disadvantage. The results
are presented in Table 3, covering two seasons/periods (before and after the event). We focus
only on basketball data, as we have a substantially larger sample size of such cases. The
results suggest that, when a player moves from a relative advantage to a relative disadvantage
in his income, his performance decreases in a statistically significant way. On the other hand,
no substantial changes are observable when someone moves from a relative income
disadvantage to a relative income advantage. This is consistent with the result that a relative
disadvantage has a significant negative impact on performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents novel empirical evidence that social comparisons matter in competitive
environments, such as sports markets. Our two unique data sets, focusing on basketball and
soccer, explore players’ pay and performance relationship in a controlled environment. It
offers the possibility of exploring the relevance of interdependent preferences in an incentive
and performance context. We find support that inequity aversion matters. Performance is
reduced as a reaction to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality, while absolute
incentives affect performance positively. Negative deviations from the reference outcome
count more than positive deviations. This reaction is clearly visible in the soccer market and
when considering moving from a relative advantage to a relative disadvantage, or from a
relative disadvantage to a relative advantage. The regression results also support theories of
personal motivation, stressing the relevance of a performance crowding-out effect at the upper
22
income level. Our results show that such a crowding-out effect appears not only at the
absolute income level, but also at the relative income level, complementing previous studies.
The paper provides empirical support for the relevance of interdependent preferences
in a non-artificial environment, focusing on “real people” performing “real tasks” with “real
incentives”. Our results are consistent with previous experimental results, finding that
individuals care about the outcomes achieved by persons in the reference group, in addition to
their own outcomes.
Using data from professional sports, of course, has its limitations. First, the average
salaries that are paid in professional basketball and soccer are obviously much higher than in
most other occupations. Second, our results may not necessarily be transferred to situations in
which pay and performance are less visible or less easily measured. In only a few cases can
co-workers observe each other’s performance and compensation levels. However, there is a
growing literature successfully demonstrating the advantages of working with sports data
(see, e.g., Goff and Tollison 1990, Rosen and Sanderson 2001, or Szymanski 2003).
In general, the results are relevant for employees in corporations, as they often work in
teams, which are to some extent similar to sports teams. Lessons can be learned for the design
of incentive and reward mechanisms. Especially in sales driven organizations, positional
concerns are important, since measured performance is directly linked to salary (pay-for-
performance). Assuming that employee motivation is viewed as a quest for personal
economic gain, individual merit pay is presumed to be effective in this environment.
Salesmen, like financial advisors or insurance agents, are paid according to key sales
performance indicators, such as net new money, return on assets, and the number and mix of
products or policies sold within a certain period. Sales commissions often make up a large
part of their total salary. In order to stimulate internal competition and to push individual
performance, transparency is increased by comparative performance rankings among the sales
force. Moreover, the results might also be relevant in areas where relative income and rank
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ordering are especially important, such as consulting, law partnerships, and academia (Gill
and Stone 2006).
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Table 1: Inequality Aversion among Basketball Players
 Dep. V.: Performance
Index
Future  Future Present Present
 Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates
Independent Variables OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) a (5) (6) (7) a (8) (9) (10) a (11) (12)
SALARY             
RELATIVE SALARY
ABOVE (RELADV) -.281** -.579* -.357* -.431*** -.889*** -.499*** -.309*** -.741** .369* -.423*** -1.01*** .219
 (-3.23) (-2.48) (-2.52) (-4.78) (-3.97) (-3.49) (-3.99) (-3.18) (2.57) (-5.19) (-4.41) (1.42)
RELATIVE SALARY
BELOW (RELDISADV) -.131*** -.663*** -.386*** -.096*** -.487*** -.328*** -.184*** -.954*** -.653*** -.178*** -.921*** -.481***
 (-6.47) (-5.10) (-4.10) (-4.44) (-3.79) (-3.47) (-9.59) (-7.16) (-7.44) (-7.32) (-5.68) (-4.84)
ABSOLUTE SALARY .896*** 1.49*** .39** 1.08*** 1.8*** .526*** .857*** 1.62*** -.35** .98*** 1.86*** -.192
 (ABSAL) (9.92) (7.44) (3.07) (11.43) (9.63) (4.10) (10.50) (8.36) (-2.72) (10.91) (9.46) (-1.38)
PLAYER’S CHARACTER     
AGE -.235 -.337 4.33*** -.298 -.426 4.3*** -.0917 -.129 4.99*** -.1 -.141 4.99***
 (-1.37) (-1.00) (14.45) (-1.76) (-1.34) (14.28) (-0.62) (-0.43) (20.93) (-0.69) (-0.50) (20.63)
AGE SQ .184 .005 -.082*** .246 .006 -.082*** -.031 -.001 -.093*** -.031 -.001 -.093***
 (1.08) (0.79) (-15.84) (1.46) (1.11) (-15.70) (-0.21) (-0.15) (-22.76) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-22.57)
TEAM No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
SEASON Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PLAYER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test joint significance 613.54*** 258.48*** 17.88*** 50.76*** 30.73*** 16.46*** 700.79*** 297.39*** 21.00*** 736.17*** 323.13*** 10.32***
 (REL. & ABOLUTE INC.)
R-Squared 0.458 0.458 0.221 0.470 0.470 0.252 0.414 0.414 0.275 0.423 0.423 0.287
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Groups (Players) 696 696 696 696 696 696 916 916 916 916 916 916
Number of Observations 2693 2693 2693 2693 2693 2693 3485 3485 3485 3485 3485 3485
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and the 0.1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. a beta or standardized regression coefficients.
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Table 2: Inequality Aversion among Soccer Players
 Dep. V.: Performance
Index
Future  Future Present Present
 Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates Reference Group: Teammates
Independent Variables OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE OLS CLUST FE
 (13)a (14) (15) (16) a (17) (18) (19)a (20) (21) (22) a (23) (24)
SALARY             
RELATIVE SALARY
ABOVE (RELADV)
-.162* -.3 -.32* -.147*** -.506*** -.483*** -.033 -.074 .395** -.048 -.106 .087
 (-2.17) (-1.88) (-1.96) (-3.71) (-3.88) (-3.77) (-0.65) (-0.53) (3.08) (-0.66) (-0.62) (0.55)
RELATIVE SALARY
BELOW (RELDISADV)
-.262*** -.902*** -.662*** -.428*** -.792*** -.48** -.214*** -.778*** -.86*** -.234*** -.852*** -.482***
 (-8.61) (-8.22) (-5.45) (-4.72) (-4.78) (-2.92) (-9.78) (-9.31) (-9.44) (-6.09) (-6.36) (-3.68)
ABSOLUTE SALARY .478*** .559*** .531*** .897*** 1.05*** .707*** .296*** .406*** -.319*** .292** .4** -.003
 (ABSAL) (6.69) (5.02) (4.25) (8.14) (8.22) (5.49) (5.86) (4.41) (-3.43) (2.92) (2.88) (-0.02)
PLAYER’S CHARACTER   
AGE .284 .242 1.14 .312 .265 1.36* .448* .39 2.04*** .45* .392 2.13***
 (1.01) (0.77) (1.75) (1.11) (0.85) (2.09) (2.02) (1.58) (5.94) (2.00) (1.60) (6.18)
AGE SQ -.254 -.004 -.016* -.26 -.004 -.012** -.488* -.008 -.036*** -.482* -.009 -.039***
 (-0.92) (-0.68) (-2.18) (-0.94) (-0.71) (-2.63) (-2.22) (-1.73) (-7.73) (-2.17) (-1.73) (-8.12)
TEAM No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
SEASON Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PLAYER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test joint significance 95.60*** 58.00*** 33.46*** 105.36*** 68.59*** 34.82*** 120.86*** 73.23*** 36.78*** 121.95*** 76.63*** 10.80***
 (REL. & ABOLUTE INC.)    
R-Squared 0.223 0.223 0.163 0.265 0.265 0.232 0.154 0.154 0.145 0.166 0.166 0.168
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Groups (Players) 634 634 634 634 634 634 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Number of Observations 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 2784 2784 2784 2784 2784 2784
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the  5%, 1% and the 0.1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. a beta or standardized regression coefficients.
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Table 3: Moving from one situation to the other (two periods)
Paired t test
Case I: Moving from a relative advantage to a relative disadvantage
Observations Mean
Performance Before (t-1) 313 10.586
Performance After (t) 313 8.812
Difference 1.774
Ho: Mean (Performance Before (t-1) - Performance After t) =0
t= 9.16
Case II: Moving from a relative disadvantage to a relative advantage
Observations Mean
Performance Before (t-1) 390 12.280
Performance After (t) 390 12.443
Difference -0.160
Ho: Mean (Performance Before (t-1) - Performance After t) =0
t= -0.87
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Table A1
Summary Statistics
Table A1: Summary Statistics Basketball
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
POINTS SCORED 516.418 473.074 0 2491
TOTAL REBOUNDS 225.609 202.183 0 1201
STEALS 43.054 37.908 0 231
BLOCKS 27.506 38.599 0 332
ASSISTS 117.531 136.715 0 916
TURNOVERS 78.206 65.672 0 337
FIELD GOALS MISSED 238.598 208.423 0 1153
FREE THROWS MISSED 34.417 36.396 0 392
AGE 27.381 4.404 18 43
GAMES PLAYED 53.277 24.741 1 83
ABSOLUTE SALARY (t) 2.737 3.259 0.001 33.1
ABSOLUTE SALARY (t+1) 3.481 3.62 0.001 33.1
Table A2: Summary Statistics Soccer
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GOALS 2.026 3.239 0.00 28.00
ASSISTS 2.002 2.576 0.00 19.00
DUELS WON 317.008 230.543 0.00 1236.00
COMMITTED FOULS 26.045 22.157 0.00 119.00
OBTAINED FOULS (BEING
FOULED)
26.020 24.941 0.00 169.00
AGE 26.557 4.154 17.00 40.00
GAMES PLAYED 18.333 10.055 1.00 34.00
ABSOLUTE SALARY (t) 2.809 2.528 0.05 25
ABSOLUTE SALARY (t+1) 2.929 2.572 0.05 25
